Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences

Matching problems with preferences are all around us: they arise when agents seek to be allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes. Efficient algorithms are needed for producing matchings that optimise the satisfaction of the agents according to their preference lists.

In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the study of algorithmic aspects of matching problems with preferences, partly reflecting the growing number of applications of these problems worldwide. The importance of the research area was recognised in 2012 through the award of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley.

This book describes the most important results in this area, providing a timely update to The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (D Gusfield and R W Irving, MIT Press, 1989) in connection with stable matching problems, whilst also broadening the scope to include matching problems with preferences under a range of alternative optimality criteria.

Readership: Students and Professionals interested in algorithms, especially in the study of algorithmic aspects of matching problems with preferences.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Preliminary definitions, results and motivation
Chapter 2. The Stable Marriage problem: An update
Chapter 3. SM and HR with indifference
Chapter 4. The Stable Roommates problem
Chapter 5. Further stable matching problems
Chapter 6. Pareto optimal matchings
Chapter 7. Popular matchings
Chapter 8. Profile-based optimal matchings