Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, 3rd Edition

The perfect balance of readability and formalism.

Joel Watson has refined his successful text to make it even more student-friendly. A number of sections have been added, and numerous chapters have been substantially revised. Dozens of new exercises have been added, along with solutions to selected exercises. Chapters are short and focused, with just the right amount of mathematical content and end-of-chapter exercises. New passages walk students through tricky topics.

Table of Contents

Part I: Representations and Basic Assumptions
Chapter 2: The Extensive Form
Chapter 3: Strategies and The Normal Form
Chapter 4: Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs
Chapter 5: General Assumptions and Methodology

Part II: Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings
Chapter 6: Dominance and Best Response
Chapter 7: Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
Chapter 8: Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest
Chapter 9: Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 10: Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting
Chapter 11: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 12: Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
Chapter 13: Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings

Part III: Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings
Chapter 14: Detailes of the Extensive Form
Chapter 15: Sequential Rationality and Subgame Perfection
Chapter 16: Topics in Industrial Organization
Chapter 17: Parlor Games
Chapter 18: Bargaining Problems
Chapter 19: Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games
Chapter 20: Games with Joint Decisions: Negotiation Equilibrium
Chapter 21: Unverifiable Investment, Hold up, Options, and Ownership
Chapter 22: Repeated Games and Reputation
Chapter 23: Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill

Part IV: Information
Chapter 24: Random Events and Incomplete Information
Chapter 25: Risks and Incentives in Contracting
Chapter 26: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability
Chapter 27: Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation
Chapter 28: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Chapter 29: Job-Market Signaling and Reputation